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met without uttering the magic words 'harmless error,'. . .[but] the
reverse is not true." 22 In other words, the Supreme Court requires a
"'principled explanation' of how the [state] court reached [its] conclu-
sion."'23 This high level of scrutiny set forth by Justice O'Connor is
reinforced in her majority opinion in Richmond.
With the aid of Stringer, Sochor, Espinosa and now Richmond,
Virginia attorneys should be better equipped to battle the indifference
of the Virginia Supreme Court on the issue of specificity in aggravat-
ing factor instructions. The cases provide clear authority for the
22 Id. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
requirement that at some point in the Virginia sentencing scheme, an
express and specific use of properly named aggravating factors must
be made evident. Defense attorneys should be prepared to argue the
importance of these cases and how the Eighth Amendment requires a
level of individualized consideration that Virginia does not currently
provide.




113 S. Ct. 835 (1993)
United States Supreme Court
Wilbum Dobbs was found guilty of murder and was sentenced to
death by a Georgia jury. In his first federal habeas petition, Dobbs
argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at his
sentencing hearing, particularly citing the closing argument made by
his court-appointed attorney. At an evidentiary hearing held on the
matter, the State was unable to produce a transcript of counsel's
closing argument, so the court relied on the testimony of the attorney
himself as to the content of his closing arguments. The district court
found Dobbs had received effective assistance. 1 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying once again on counsel's
testimony at the evidentiary hearing regarding his closing argument in
mitigation.
2
Subsequently, the State located a transcript of the closing argu-
ment, which varied in some degree from counsel's recollection.
3
Nevertheless, the court of appeals denied the petitioner's motion to
supplement the record with the sentencing transcript. In affirming that
denial, the Eleventh Circuit found that the "law of the case" doctrine
prevented it from reconsidering its prior rejection of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.4 Although the court acknowledged the
manifest injustice exception to the law of the case doctrine,5 the court
refused to apply the exception, reasoning in Catch-22 fashion that
without the transcript, petitioner would be unable to show an injustice. 6
Petitioner Dobbs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
1 Civ. Action No. 80-247 (ND Ga., Jan. 13, 1984), p. 24.
2 Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499, 1514, and n. 15 (1986).
3 The majority wrote that the newly found transcript "flatly contra-
dicted the account given by counsel in key respects." Dobbs v. Zant, 113
S. Ct. at 835 (1993). However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
objected to this characterization of the transcript. At the evidentiary
hearing, defense counsel thought he had raised two issues in his closing
argument: the death penalty is improper in any case, and the killing was
impulsive. Counsel testified that he was "'sure' he had argued the
impulsive-killing point," that he "assume[d] [he] argued it," and that "a
lot of this is really not from actual recollection." Tr. 70-71 (Nov. 10,
1982). The transcript revealed that counsel made only the impropriety of
the death penalty argument.
4 Dobbs v. Zant, 963 F.2d 1403, 1409 (1991).
5 Under the policy of "law of the case," an appellate court's
determination of a legal question (here petitioner's ineffective assistance
The United States Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari
and reversed the decision of the Eleventh Circuit.7 Citing Gardner v.
Florida8 and Gregg v. Georgia,9 the Court emphasized the importance
of reviewing capital sentences on a complete record. 10 The Court went
on to consider the transcript's key relevance here (i.e., the factual
predicate for deciding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim) and
found that a complete record would have allowed the appeals court to
waive the law of the case doctrine by applying the manifest injustice
exception.11 Further, the Court held that the exclusion of the transcript
was not justified by the delay between the original determination of
effective assistance and the discovery of the transcript, because the
delay resulted from the State's erroneous representations and not the
petitioner's actions. 12 Finally, although the Court speculated that an
inadequate or harmful closing argument, coupled with a failure to
present mitigating evidence, could produce harmful results, the Court
followed its normal practice of letting the courts more familiar with a
case conduct the harmless error analysis.1 3 Therefore, the case was
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 
14
of counsel claim) will generally be found binding on both trial courts on
remand and appellate courts on subsequent appeals. Since it is policy and
not law, it is general practice to disregard law of the case when to hold
otherwise would work manifest injustice.
6 Dobbs, 963 F.2d at 1409.
7 Dobbs v. Zant, 113 S. Ct. 835 (1993).
8 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977) (emphasizing the importance of a
complete record in reviewing capital sentences).
9428 U.S. 153 (1976) (finding that the provision requiring transmit-
tal of a complete transcript and record on appeal provides an important
"safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice").
0 Dobbs, 113 S. Ct. at 836.
11 Id.12 Id.
13 Id., at 836, n. 1.
14 Id. at 836.
FACTS
HOLDING
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Writing in Dobbs, the Court was adamant in its support of the
complete record doctrine as set forth in Gardner. The Court added little
new law in this opinion because the case is premised on rather unusual
facts. However, Dobbs does provide defense counsel with additional
support for arguing the importance of a complete record upon appeal.
Therefore, defense counsel facing obstacles upon appeal with supple-
menting the record will want to use Gardner in conjunction with Dobbs
to argue that the appellate court must have a full record before it in order
to decide the case.
Summary and analysis by:
Roberta F. Green
GARDNER v. DIXON
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In September 1983, John Sterling Gardner was convicted of first-
degree murder in the deaths of two restaurant workers during a robbery.
The court imposed the death penalty. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed both the conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and the
United States Supreme Court denied review.1 Gardnercommenced state
habeas proceedings but was denied relief.2 Gardner then filed a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court. Both the district court and the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied relief.3 Gardner's requests forrehearing
were denied.
In August 1992, Gardner filed a motion for relief from the federal
district court's judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 4 Gardner specifically requested relief under Rule
60(b)(2) and (6) and submitted supporting affidavits which he claimed
showed newly discovered evidence of alcohol and drug abuse by his
attorney, Bruce Fraser, during his murder trial and sentencing. Gardner's
execution was stayed by the Superior Court of Forsyth County until
October 23, 1992.
The district court denied Gardner's motion for relief and Gardner
appealed to the Fourth Circuit. He also filed an application for a stay
of execution and a certificate of probable cause to appeal the district
court's ruling.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling and denied Gardner's request for a stay of execution. 5 Noting the
"difficulty of prevailing on successive habeas petitions' 6, the court
specifically addressed the use of a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
60(b) motion as "the newest weapon in capital-habeas litigation, in part
because it has the tendency to compel a court to address a petitioner's
1 State v. Gardner, 319 S.E.2d 591, 594-96 (N.C. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).
2 Gardner v. State, 361 S.E.2d 598 (N.C. 1986), cert. denied, 486
U. S. 1061 (1987).
3 Gardner v.Dixon, No. 91-4010,slipop. at 19 (unpublished), 1992
U.S. App. LEXIS 12971 (4th Cir. June 4, 1992). See case summary of
Gardner, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 30 (1992).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides, in pertinent part: "On motion and
upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or aparty's legal
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: ... (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move fora new trial under Rule
59(b);... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for
reasons (1), (2), and (3) notmore than one year after the judgment, order
claims on the merits. '7 In conformity with its treatment of an appeal of
a Rule 60(b) denial in Jones v. Murray8 , the court treated Gardner's
appeal as: "(1) a petition for writ of habeas corpus, (2) a successive
petition, and (3) a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion addressing the final
judgment of the district court." 9
The court held: (1) because Gardner failed to show cause and
prejudice or actual innocence, his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was procedurally barred; 10 (2) Gardner's claim failed under the
abuse of the writ doctrine because he did not present the alleged new
evidence in his prior habeas petition and he failed to show cause and
prejudice or actual innocence; 11 and (3) the district court did not err in
denying relief under Rule 60(b) because there is no evidence the outcome




As the Fourth Circuit noted, it is very difficult for a petitioner to
prevail in successive habeas corpus petitions. In its treatment of
Gardner's petition as both a writ of habeas corpus and a successive
petition, the court illustrated its point.
The Fourth Circuit found that Gardner's habeas claim was
procedurally barred by North Carolina General Statute Section 15A-
1419(a)(3), which provides that a motion for appropriate relief may be
denied if "upon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to
adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but
did not do so."' 13 Similarly, in treating Gardner's petition as a successive
habeas petition, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the standards of review set
forth in McCleskey v. Zant.14 Under McCleskey, in order to excuse a
failure to raise a claim in a prior habeas petition, a petitioner must show
cause for failing to raise it or show that a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim."
'15
or proceeding was entered or taken."
5 Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013 (unpublished), 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28147, at*2 (4th Cir. October 21, 1992). Gardner was executed
by lethal injection on October 23, 1992.
6 Id. at *7.
7 Id. at *8.
8 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1992). See case summary of Jones, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
9 Gardner, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28147, at *8-*9.
10 Id. at *9-*10.
11 Id. at*10-*15.
12 Id. at *35-*36.
13 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (Michie 1992).
14 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).
15 Id. at 1470.
